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The Effects of College Education on Career
Earnings in the NBA
George Langelett, Kuo-Liang Chang & Michael Haupert*
The purpose of our research is to investigate whether the high school
basketball player is better off attending or forgoing his college career to enter the NBA
directly out of high school. We measure "better off' by total salary earned in the first ten
years of a player's NBA career. Using both OLS and a Heckit model, to control for
possible sample selection bias, our results suggest that although college is an investment
period for athletes, rational athletes do understand the opportunity cost of each year spent
in college, with the most talented players forgoing their college education altogether.
(130, J44, 150).
ABSTRACT.

I. Introduction
In 1995 the Minnesota Timberwolves drafted Kevin Garnett out of
Farragut Academy (high school). The selection of Garnett changed the
nature of the NBA draft, creating a dilemma for both players and NBA
teams. 1 This new dilemma was whether potential NBA players should
forgo their college education and immediately start their professional
careers with the possible payoff of a lucrative contract, or continue to
play college ball for free, investing in valuable human capital in the
process. 2 On behalf of the NBA teams, this draft development created a
new dimension of decision-making and increased risk. By drafting a
player directly out of high school, teams were betting on highly uncertain
potential talent.
Young men experience some of the greatest changes in their athletic
development during their college years. A percentage of athletes reach
their potential during college years, while many potential superstars never
reach expectations for a plethora of reasons including injuries, burnout,
personal and family problems, academic difficulties, and substance
abuse.
Compounding this problem is the reality that with only two rounds
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in the NBA draft, in order to draft a player out of high school, teams must
forgo a talented player who has reached his athletic potential in college
and could immediately contribute at the NBA level. Developmentally,
the high school athlete may be years away from being competitive at the
NBA level. But on the flip-side, if a team decides to draft talent that has
been developed over the course of a college career instead of potential
high school talent, they risk losing the top talent available, as evidenced
by the Minnesota Timberwolves drafting Kevin Garnett and Charlotte
drafting Kobe Bryant.
Li and Rosen ( 1998) explain that for firms facing asymmetric
information about potential employee performance, if an unraveling
mechanism becomes part of employment contracts, firms become less
risk adverse and have an opportunity to hire potentially riskier
employees. Grossthuis, Hill, and Perri (2007) apply the theory of contract
unraveling to NBA firm behavior. They demonstrate that with the change
in league policy to lengthen rookie contracts from 2 years to a 4th year
option, with the accompanying league-controlled pay scale, individual
teams have an incentive to engage in riskier behavior regarding their
rookie draft picks. They demonstrate empirically that teams have engaged
in drafting potentially risker prospects since the change in the league
contracts. While previous studies have focused on incentives for the
management ofNBA teams, by contrast, our study instead focuses on the
behavior of the athlete, particularly, high school prospects facing an
optimization decision of when to declare oneself eligible for the NBA
draft.
For the potential athlete, the decision to forgo college basketball and
declare eligibility for the NBA draft has personal implications. During a
player's college career, he is under the tutelage of some of the greatest
development coaches in the country; is able to hone his fundamental
skills such as shooting, ball handling, rebounding and defense by playing
against much higher caliber competition than experienced in high school;
and has the opportunity to develop his intuition and understanding of
game dynamics.
The college years are when student athletes have an opportunity to
develop their human capital and acquire social capital. Most importantly,
for most college basketball players, their athletic scholarship provides
them the opportunity to earn a college degree, which will aid their career
development outside of basketball - a likely necessity for most college
athletes. 3
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But each year of development in college is not free. The opportunity
cost for the student athlete is potentially enormous. Instead of playing in
college for no salary, each year the potential star could be making
millions of dollars in the NBA. Also, each season the student athlete
plays college hoops, the athlete is exposed to potential career-ending
injuries.
The purpose of our research is to ask whether the high school
basketball player is better off going to college and developing his
professional skills, including human and social capital, or forgoing his
college career to enter the NBA directly out of high school. We employ
a narrow definition of "better off' as a higher total salary in the first ten
years of a player's NBA career. A ten year cutoff was required for data
reasons, and will be explained later. We include only those players who
actually entered the NBA, as opposed to high school and college athletes
who were not successful in their attempts to play NBA basketball. Ten
years of earnings in the NBA are used to compare the success of players
drafted out of high school to those drafted out of college.

II. Background
Pay in any profession is determined by three primary variables: the skill
set the employee brings to the job, including human and social capital;
employee performance or merit on the job; and the market structure of
the profession. The degree to which each of these variables contributes
to employee pay may vary significantly across occupations, but together
these three determinants explain employee compensation in virtually
every profession.
Human capital represents the natural ability, skill set, experiences,
and "know how" the worker brings to the job.4 Economists model human
capital as people making investments that will better themselves in their
careers. These investments include formal education, vocational training,
on-the-job training, and experiences that make the employees more
productive at their job. Social capital is the employee's ability to
effectively communicate, get along with one's colleagues, and work
efficiently with others. In the NBA, social capital is required for
teamwork, leadership, and the always important "public relations."
Employee performance, or merit pay, is the economic notion of
marginal revenue product. That is, employees are paid according to their
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productivity, as measured by the amount of additional revenue they bring
into the finn. Assuming qualified and productive labor is relatively scarce
and performance varies across individual workers, employers have an
incentive to give pay increases to their workers based on individual
perfonnance.
The market structure of the profession is the economic market
structure of the industry. Market structure may range from monopoly to
perfect competition, each with associated market power and ability to
capture economic rents. Internal market structure also affects worker
pay. Job characteristics, including job hazards and qualifications that
detennine the available labor pool, industry and finn location, local and
internal job markets, product maturity, union presence, and finn size and
organization all contribute to employee wages.

III. The NBA Labor Market
Michael Wallace (1988) presents an overview of the three pay
detenninants for professional basketball players in the NBA. The human
capital basketball players bring to the NBA is the set of basketball skills,
such as shooting, ball handling, rebounding and defense. Human capital
is developed throughout a player's high school and college years as well
as his career in the NBA. A player's draft position in the NBA draft and
number of years experience in the league are two indicators of human
capital.
Merit is measured by the performance of the athlete. David Berri
(1999) models the contribution of player statistics (both offensive and
defensive) to team wins. Faced with free agency in the NBA, teams are
forced to pay their more productive players a competitive wage or lose
them to another team after they become eligible for free agency, usually
in their third or fourth year in the league. Thus, players in the NBA are
compensated according to their perfonnance on the court.
The market structure of the NBA could be modeled as either a
monopoly or oligopoly (competing with other sports, such as the NFL
and NHL for attendance and television ratings). Market structure
variables internal to the NBA include union presence and labor
negotiations, discrimination, individual team markets, labor
segmentation, and the salary cap. Labor negotiations over salary
contracts occur between the National Basketball Players Association
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(NBPA), formed in 1954, and the league owners.
Discrimination in the NBA is a topic studied at length by economists.
Kahn and Sherer (1988) used eleven player productivity variables to
estimate the racial wage gap during the 1985-86 season. After
controlling for productivity differences, they found a twenty-five percent
wage gap between black and white players. Likewise, Koch and
VanderHill (1988) used college and NBA statistics and market
characteristics to determine player salaries. They also found a pay
advantage for white athletes in the NBA. But a more recent study, Dey
( 1997), found that after controlling for player performance statistics from
1987 to 1993, while a significant salary gap for black players was present
in 1987, by 1992 it had disappeared. Dey attributes this closing of the
salary gap to free agency, an increase in the productivity of black
athletes, and a change in customer preferences. Hill (2004) does not find
evidence of any pay discrimination when investigating the NBA in the
1990s. He adds height to the performance, draft, and experience
variables used by others, and measures these variables over the previous
three years, instead of just one.
We are not so much interested in the discrimination literature as the
models used to measure the determinants of salary. In one of the earliest
articles on NBA labor markets, Robert Mogull (1977) found evidence
that blacks and whites were rewarded differently for performance criteria.
He regresses salary on several performance variables. 5
These
performance variables, sometimes weighted by games played, remain
common throughout the NBA labor literature. In various combinations
these same independent variables have been used by Hamilton (1997),
Gius and Johnson (1998), Hoang and Rascher (1999), Leonard and
Prinzinger ( 1999), Eschker, Perez, and Siegler (2004), Groothuis and Hill
(2004), Kahn and Shah (2005), Stroh (2007), and Yang and Lin (2010).
Jenkins (1996) adds a position dummy and indexes production variables
for both career and season. Hoang and Rascher added draft position and
frequency of a player being traded. Eschker, Perez, and Siegler added a
superstar effect and player age. Groothuis and Hill (2004) used a hazard
function with the typical performance variables, adding draft position,
height, weight, and race in an attempt to determine impacts on the
duration of player careers.
Team markets are divided primarily between large market teams and
small market teams. Large market teams, with greater gate and television
revenues, have larger budgets for their team payrolls. Thus, teams in
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larger markets are better able to compete for talent by offering higher
player salaries. 6
The labor market in the NBA is divided by player position: forwards,
centers, and guards, with salaries for each position determined by supply
and demand. Likewise, salaries in the labor market can be divided
between starters and players that fill the bench on each team. Finally,
player mobility plays a role in the labor market. The basketball lockout
of 1998-99, and the subsequent negotiations that followed, led to an
agreement that drafted rookies would sign three-year contracts. After the
third year teams could extend the player's contract for a fourth year. In
the fifth year the player would become a free agent, with the club having
the right of first refusal. The right of first refusal gives the player's team
the opportunity to match salary offers made by any other team in order
to retain the services of the athlete.
Following the labor negations of the 1998-99 lockout, the "salary
cap" was revised for NBA teams. During the first three years, new player
salaries were set by the league. After the third year, a player's salary
could rise by a maximum of 12% annually. Total player salaries for each
team are not to exceed 57% of each team's revenues. Each year 10% of
player salaries are put into an escrow account. If player salaries exceed
57% of team revenues, money is taken out of the escrow account and
given back to the team owner to make up the difference.

IV. High School Players in the NBA
Moses Malone was the first basketball player to play American
professional basketball without first having played in college. He joined
the now defunct American Basketball Association (ABA) in 1974. The
ABA eventually merged with the NBA in 1976. At the time, the NBA
did not allow players to enter its league without having first attended
college. That restriction no longer exists, though the NBA did recently
institute a minimum age requirement to join the league.7
Since 1995, when our data set begins, 40 players have been drafted
directly out of high school by NBA teams. Since Kevin Garnett was
drafted in 1995, through 2005, at least one high school player was drafted
each year. In fact, except for 1997 and 2002, at least two high school
players were drafted each year, with an astonishing ten high school
players selected in 2005 (Figure 1). This is even more impressive
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considering that the NBA draft has only two rounds, consisting of 60
total picks.
In 2006 the NBA changed its policy, establishing a minimum age of
19 for draft eligibility. Since 2006, the NBA has instead drafted more
talented players from European leagues and from across the developing
world. Thus, the years 1995 -2005 provide a unique time period to study
the decision making behavior of high school basketball stars as they face
the choice between college or the NBA.
NBA Draft by Years of College Experience 1995-2010
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Figure 1. NBA Draft by Cohort

V. Methodology
College education will be modeled as an investment by athletes in human
and social capital. For the athlete, the college years are a period of time
when players develop their athletic talent (human capital). The NBA
draft is modeled as the League's assessment of the stock of human capital
(i.e. proficiency at the game of basketball) each player has acquired at the
start of his career in the NBA.
There are numerous variables that affect the length and quality of a
player's career, including work ethic, injuries, and luck. Since we know
of no way to measure these, we will instead use the ceteris paribus
assumption to model player careers in the NBA. For purposes of
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studying the effects of human capital formation during the college years
on each player's career, NBA careers will be modeled as dependent on
the stock of human capital each player brings into the NBA. 8 Thus, the
NBA draft will be modeled as the league's assessment of each player's
potential stock of human capital at time period = 0. We want to test the
hypothesis that college education has a positive and significant
contribution to the career earnings of an NBA player.
The difficulty with any assessment of potential is that in a
competitive industry potential ability (human capital developed in
college) does not always correlate positively with actual performance.
Thus, the first three years, which is the length of the standard rookie
contract, tend to be a probationary period when teams evaluate the actual
performance ofeach new player. During this probationary period athletes
will either fail to be competitive at the NBA level, and have a career of
less than three years; or excel in performance, and have a long career.
Therefore, we model a player's first three years in the NBA as a
probationary period, where teams are assessing whether each athlete can
be competitive at the NBA level of competition.
There are numerous difficulties in trying to compare careers in the
NBA based on player performance variables, including variable weights,
disaggregation of player versus team effects, and annual versus career
statistics. We simplify this problem by using career earnings in the
league to measure each player's career. Assuming players are paid their
marginal revenue product, career earnings become a good measure of
each player's performance during his NBA career. Thus, the basic model
utilized in this paper is:
Player's NBA Career Earning= f (Player's stock ofhuman
capital, Social capital, On the job performance)

(1)

Our study uses data from 1995, the year Kevin Garnett started his career
in the NBA, through 2010, the latest year for which data are available.
Career earnings in the NBA are discounted back to 1995 to produce a
present value of earnings. To make the salary data linear, the natural log
of the present value of career earnings is used. Six years of draft data
were used in our study, starting with the 1995 draft and ending with
2000. For the year 2000 draft, ten years of player career data is available.
Thus, to create a consistent comparison of player careers across draft
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years, for each year's draft, the first ten years of player data were used to
proxy player performance.
Thus, the salary variable becomes:

salary,
CPI, J
Career Earnings = l n (
=1995+ 1
CPI1995

°

1

I

(2)

Where j = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, depending on the year of the draft.
Two primary variables are used to model the right hand side of
equation (1). First, each player's draft position is used to measure the
league's ex-ante assessment of each athlete's stock of human capital.
Second, each player's education is used to measure his investment in
human capital. Years of college experience is used to measure the effects
of a college education, with values ranging from zero to four. Players
drafted out of high school are given a value of zero.9
Two variables that affect each athlete's stock of human capital are
player position and race. Also, two dummy variables are used to control
for player position: one for forwards and another for centers. Since a
player's race has been shown to impact salaries and has the potential to
affect the league's judgment of the athlete's marketability for
employment, we include it as a dummy variable.10
Finally, three control variables are added to the model. First, a
dummy variable for the division of the college is used to proxy the
quality of the capital formation experience during an athlete's time in
college. Division- I college basketball schools are given a value of 1. All
other colleges were given a value of 0. The assumption is that playing a
higher level of competition at a Division- I school will positively affect
the athlete's human capital formation experience. Second, to control for
player performance during the probationary period in the NBA, two
additional variables are included. Average-minutes-per-game and
number-of-games-played are included to proxy player performance
during his first three years in the league. These two control variables
assume that regardless of position, athletes who are performing well in
the NBA will play both more games, and more minutes during each
game.
The basic empirical model used to test the effects of human capital
formation during college becomes:

34

The Journal ofEconomics, XXXIX, No. I, 2013

Career earnings = a 1 +a2 Draft +a3 College +a4 Division I
+a5 Forward +a6 Center +a7 Race +a8 Games +� Minutes + e 1

(3)

Where Draft is the player's draft position; College is the number of years
of college education; Division I is a college-tier dummy; Forward and
Center are player position dummies; Race is a dummy variable; Games
is the number of games played during the first three years; and Minutes
are the average number of minutes played per game during the first three
years in the NBA.
Given that 15 years of data are available, and this study investigates
career earnings over a ten year period, our dataset consists of all players
drafted from 1995 to 2000. 1 1 With 5 8 players drafted each year for six
years, the sample includes 347 players. 1 2 In order to avoid biasing the
educational attainment variable, 28 foreign players were removed from
the sample. Likewise, 66 additional players were removed from the
sample because they never played a single game in the NBA. Including
these players would cause censorial problems with both the games-played
and the minutes played variables. 13 Thus, our resulting sample size has
253 observations.

VI. Heckman's 2-Stage Model (Heck.it)
Not surprisingly, there is a noteworthy gap in career earnings between
players who survived the first three-year trial period and those who did
not. This characteristic suggests a potential problem of sample selection
bias caused by many other factors determined before these players
reached the NBA draft. For example, human capital theory commonly is
applied to explain such performance differences, and focuses on the
resulting "endowment" differences in players' skills and talent before
they were drafted. Thus, one may argue that players who had already
accumulated enough skills to excel in their NBA career out of high
school tend to forgo college. We expect that a significant portion of the
differences in NBA performance during the probationary period is a
product of these unobservable variables that are beyond the scope of this
study.
However, if the selection bias exists as the wage gap data suggest, the
conventional OLS method becomes questionable when we attempted to
estimate equation (3). Besides, for those players who did not make it
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through the first three years, their annual income from years 4 to 10 was
obviously zero. We wanted to emphasize that this zero income is an
indicator to show the performance of each player also affects the
magnitude of career earnings. Therefore, the application of the Tobit
model becomes conceptually unsuitable since the data is not really
"censored." 14 Instead, we apply Heckman's two-stage model to correct
for the problem of sample selection bias as suggested by Heckman
(1979); Maddala (1992) and Greene (2000). Moreover, the first three
years in the NBA appear to be a probationary period when teams are
evaluating the performance of recently drafted athletes. The majority of
athletes in the NBA play either for three or fewer years or more than ten
years (see Figure 2).
15
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Figure 2.
Therefore, without making any unnecessary assumptions, we created a
dummy variable called passing-grade (PG) to estimate the probably of
surviving the first three years of an NBA career after the draft. We
assume:
Passing Grade = f (Player performance during first
three years in NBA).

(4)
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Players with a 1 -3 year career were coded "O" for PG, and players with
a 4+ year career were coded " l " for PG. In the first stage we estimate PG
using the binomial probit model. That is,
PG=l if PG* >O and
PG=O if PG* <= 0

(5)

Sequentially, "average-minutes-per-game" and "number-of-games
played" during an athlete's first three years in the NBA become the
instrumental variables used to estimate Passing Grade (PG) in the first
stage.
First Stage Estimation:
Passing Grade= b 1 +b2 Draft +b3 College +b4 Division 1 +
b5 For ward +b6 Center +b7 Race +bg Games +b9 Minutes + e 1

(6)

After estimating the binomial probit in the first stage, the resulting
inverse Mills ratio (A) will be stored and injected as an independent
variable in the second stage of the Heckit Model to estimate career
earnings:
Career earnings = c 1 +c2 Draft +c3 College +c4 Division 1 +
c5 For ward +c6 Center +c7 Race +cg (}.) + e 1

(7)

Equation (7) estimates the effects of a college education on career
earnings after controlling for the NBA's pre-career assessment (draft
position) and sample selection bias problem. We hypothesize that the
coefficient for the college education variable should be positive and
significant. On the other hand, if we cannot reject the null hypothesis of
zero for the coefficient of the inverse Mills ratio }. (i.e., cg), we should
instead use OLS to estimate equation (3). For the purpose of comparison,
we applied both a Heckit and OLS model in this study.
Finally, we applied both the White's general test and the Breusch
Pagan Lagrange multiplier test (Greene 2000; p. 508-5 1 1 ) to investigate
the potential problem ofheteroscedasticity. The robust covariance matrix
for the OLS model (equation (3)) generated the Chi-Squared statistic of
24.61 (0.001 8), which indicated that the hypothesis of homoscedasticity
is rejected. The LM statistics from the Breusch-Pagan tests suggested that
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Draft, College, Games, and Minutes contained heteroscedasticity when
regressed on Career earnings separately. However, we only found minor
variations on the standard errors of the heteroscedasticity corrected
(White) coefficients, compared to the original OLS results. Moreover, as
suggested by Johnson and DiNardo (1997), while appending a White
noise error causes no problem of bias in the liner model, the process may
cause unknown bias in the nonlinear models such as probit for our Heckit
model. The lack of standard method in hypothesis testing also makes the
Probit model with heteroscedasticity difficult to interpret and analyze
(Greene 2000). Therefore, in this study we report the original estimate
results both for the OLS and Heckit models. But we would like to
acknowledge the existence of heteroscedasticity in our results.

VII. Results
Table 1 lists career earnings (before the natural log is calculated) broken
down according to the explanatory variables in equation (3). Foreign
players are included in this table only for comparison purposes. The
results indicate that the mean career earnings vary greatly across groups.
Players drafted out of high school earned an average of $43 .5 million,
while the mean for college seniors is $15 .9 million, and for foreign
players is $ 17.4 million. By position, on average, forwards have the
highest career earnings, and centers have the lowest. For the race
variable, players of color now earn $6 million more than their white
counterparts, a gap in the opposite direction of that found in research
focusing on an earlier time period.
Table 2 summarizes the results from Heckit and OLS. The
regressions for equations (6) and (7) were run using the Heckit 2-stage
regression model, and results obtained show that the coefficient
associated with the inverse Mill's ratio (i.e., -1.86) is significant at the
0.01 % level, which indicates that the correlation between the error terms
of passing the first three years and career earnings are different than zero.
This result suggests the existence of sample selection bias and offers a
rationale to apply the Heckit model in our analysis.
In the first stage, a binomial probit model is run to estimate an
athlete' s probability of surviving the probationary period and going on to
continue his career in the league as shown by equation ( 6). Five variables
significantly affect an athlete's passing grade. First by position, forwards
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and centers are more likely to survive than guards. Referring back to
Table 1, the fact that there are only one half as many centers in the NBA,
as opposed to either guards or forwards, may explain why being a center
significantly affects one's passing grade at the 1% statistical level.
TABLE I-Descriptive Data of NBA Players 1995-2010
N
76
White
205
Color
Forward 1 24
52
Center
1 05
Guard
High
11
School
1 year
10
college
2 yrs
31
college
3 yrs
34
college
4 yrs
1 67
college
Foreign 28

Career Earnings real 1 995 dollars
Min
Mean
Max
$200,289
$ 1 1 1 ,871
$ 1 1 1 ,871
$200,289
$ 1 75,289
$ 1 63,821

$1 9,607,328
$25,855,578
$26,063,285
$ 1 9,4 16,245
$23 , 1 63 ,888
$43,486,348

$85,573 ,004
$ 1 4 1 ,950,420
$ 1 4 1 ,950,420
$8 1 ,479,000
$97,035,346
$ 1 4 1 ,950,420

Years Pro
Mean Standard
Deviation
6.62
3 . 89
7.2 1
4.43
7.08
4.30
6.98
4.00
7.06
4.48
6.70
4.20

$3,443,079

$46,325,60 1

$93,075,320

9.80

3. 52

$200,000

$38,94 1 ,90 1

$95,299,820

8 .90

4.56

$320,000

$37,696,602

$97,029,704

9.06

3. 70

$ 1 1 1 ,871

$ 1 5 ,992,605

$ 1 0 1 ,72 1 ,269

6.19

4.03

$320,000

$ 1 7,41 1 686

$8 1 479,000

4.43

4.47

Minutes played per game and games played during a player's first
three seasons in the NBA significantly affect a player's passing grade
after the third year in the NBA. For this reason, these two variables are
used as sequential instrumental variables. Finally, early draft picks are
more likely to survive the probationary period.
In the second stage, career earnings in the NBA are estimated using
Equation (7). Including an estimated passing grade for each athlete, after
three years of performance in the NBA, only the variable Draft
statistically significantly affects a player's career earnings in the NBA.
Variables such as position, level of school, and most importantly, years
of college education are all statistically insignificant. The results in Table
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2 indicate that while position and performance affect the survival rate of
any NBA players, career earnings are solely affected by the draft position
for those players who survived the trial period. We failed to reject the
null hypothesis that c3 in Equation (7) is significantly different than zero,
which suggests that college education is not a crucial variable in
determining career earnings.
TABLE 2-Heckit 2-Stage and OLS Results

Dependent Variable
Constant
Draft
Years of College
Division 1 School
Forward
Center
Race
Minutes Played per
Game
Games Played first
three years
A (Inverse Mills Ratio)
R-squared
McFadden p
A.LC.
Prob>Chi-Square

Heckit Model
Stage 2
Stage 1
(Eq 7)
(Eq 6)
Natural Log of
Passing First
Career Earnings
Three Year
in NBA
-3.6 1
1 8.44
(0.329)8**
(0.830)***
-.04
-.03
(0.01 1 )***
(0.006)* * *
-.06
-.10
(0.088)
(0. 1 56)
.27
.03
(0.357)
(.276)
-. 1 3
.77
(0. 1 87)
(0.297)** *
-.3 1
1 .4 1
(.406)** *
(0.250)
-.54
.04
(0.3 1 5)
(0.2 1 6)
.08
(0.01 5)***
.004
(0.002)**
- 1 .86
(0.244)***
.62
.61 (Pseudo RSquared)
0.60
.38
0.54
0.0002

OLS
(Eq 3)
Natural Log of
Career Earnings
in NBA
1 3 .49
(0.303)***
-0.0 1
(0.004)**
-0.09
(0.059)*
-0. 1 2
(0. 167)
0. 1 1
(0. 1 1 9)
0.55
(0. 1 63)**
-.0 1
(0. 1 32)
0.03
(0.003)* **
0.01
(0.001)***
.78
-.21

Standard errors in parenthesis; *Significant at the . 1 % level; **Significant at the .05%
level; ***Significant at the .01 % level.
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The results from the Heckit model suggest that the career earnings of
NBA players depend on the survival of the probationary period. But the
determining factors ofsurviving are playing position, minutes, and games
played. This finding is consistent with the results suggested by the OLS
method: the variables that significantly affect a player's career earnings
in the NBA are his position in the NBA draft, minutes played per game,
number of games played in the first three years, and playing center. The
signs on these statistically significant variables are also consistent with
the results from Heckit. Players drafted earlier have a lower number
(draft picks are assigned a number in the regression equal to their
position in the draft) and on average play longer and have greater career
earnings in the NBA. This suggests either that NBA general managers
are good at projecting future NBA potential, or that they are afflicted
with sunk cost bias, and will give players drafted early a longer trial
period, lasting beyond the initial three year period. 1 6 The negative sign
on years of college suggests each additional year of college ball lowers
career earnings. Likewise, the positive coefficient on minutes played per
game during the first three years suggests that players who were starters
and played most of each game enjoy high career earnings in the NBA.
Finally, the insignificant race variable suggests that salary discrimination
in the NBA may no longer be an issue, though we do not directly test for
this. Overall, the results presented in Table 2 suggest that the stocks of
human and social capital endowed by each player before they entered the
NBA are more important than education, including human capital
formation in college, if maximizing career earnings in the NBA is a
player's goal.

VIII. Conclusions
The argument against high school players in the NBA is usually some
form of the argument that "high school players can't make it in the NBA.
They should stay in college and hone their skills". Another version of the
argument frequently made in favor of staying college is that a player who
leaves college early will never have developed the necessary skills to
survive in the NBA in the long run. In other words, college coaches argue
that the skills players develop in college will create higher career
earnings than the extra salary earned in the short run.
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The results present in Tables 1 and 2 provide mixed results for this
argument that players go to college to build human capital for their NBA
careers. Table l shows that on average, players directly out of high
school have longer careers and higher career earnings than their college
and foreign counterparts. This result seems to suggest that the
exceptional basketball players make a rational decision to forego college
to start their careers in the NBA. Based on career length, earnings, and
draft position, players who go to college for one or two years to build
human capital before starting their NBA careers do better than players
who graduate from college. Players who have NBA potential, but are a
step below their high school and underclassman counterparts in terms of
basketball proficiency, spend up to four years in college to develop their
human capital as NBA athletes. Table 2 shows that career earnings are
not dependent on college attendance, but rather on draft position and
performance during the first three years in the NBA.
The results of this study suggest that although college is an
investment period for athletes toward their careers in the NBA, rational
athletes do understand the opportunity cost of each year spent in college,
with the best players forgoing their college education altogether. Thus,
it is unlikely that athletes who possess the required stock of human
capital to compete at the NBA level make an economically irrational
decision to forego college for the NBA. The criticism leveled by
sportswriters and coaches that high school seniors, such as Kevin
Garnett, Kobe Bryant and LeBron James would benefit by at least some
college experience, does not hold up. The beneficiaries of such talented
players working for free in the college ranks are the colleges, the NCAA,
and the highly paid college coaches.
In 2005, ten of 58 players chosen were drafted directly out of high
school. These high school athletes understood the financial opportunity
cost of playing in college, and made the rational choice to become draft
eligible. The 2006 draft rule was the NBA's attempt to stem the ever
increasing tide of high school students entering each year's draft.
Sports writers now say that in retrospect the 2006 change in draft age
was a misguided decision by the NBA. 1 7 The NBA desires future athletes
to first get some formal college education, and thus, high school athletes
are now attending college. Unfortunately players who already possess
the athletic ability to compete in the NBA are now forced to attend
college for a year until they reach the NBA mandated minimum age.
This is a misallocation of resources and a transfer of economic rents from
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players to colleges. It appears the rationale for keeping high school
athletes out of the draft is more for the benefit of the NCAA and NBA
owners than out of any real concern for the players.
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Endnotes
I.

2.

In I 974 Moses Malone entered the old ABA without ever going to college. But
Kevin Garnett was the first player drafted out of high school. Our paper focuses on
high school players drafted since 1 995, the firstyear ofour comprehensive salary and
draft data set.
The NBA recently ruled that players must be I 9 years old or wait one year after
graduating from high school to enter the draft. This ruling may be challenged in
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court, but even if it stands, it merely pushes the choice between college and a
potential professional career off by one year.
There are approximately 900 colleges and universities in the United States that play
basketball. Assuming that each roster is composed only of the NCAA limit of 1 3
scholarship players, there are 1 1 ,700 men playing college basketball each year, 60
ofwhom will be drafted. Since any college player is allowed to declare his eligibility
for the draft, that means 0.5% of college basketball players are drafted each year. If
only the (approximately) 350 division one schools are considered, then the
percentage of players drafted increases to l .3%.
Becker 1 964.
The performance variables were field goals per minute, field goal percentage, free
throws per minute, free throw percentage, rebounds per minute, assists per minute,
points per minute, points per game, minutes per game and experience.
The "soft" salary cap of 1 999 partially offsets this market size advantage.
Kegler, 201 0.
Although human capital formation continues throughout each athlete's career in the
NBA, the human capital formation itself depends on the career ofthe athlete. Players
who are relegated to careers as bench warmers or have their tenure terminated before
or during their first year, have little opportunity to develop human capital, and thus
their careers in the NBA are determined by the stock of human capital they possess
as they enter the NBA.
From 1 995 to 2000, 28 of the 347 players drafted by the NBA were foreign.
Although some foreign players may have some college education, the educational
records of many foreign players are difficult to assess. Because of the unclear
educational records of foreign players, and the relatively small sample, foreign
players drafted by the NBA were removed from the sample in order to focus our
study on the effects of a college education.
See Dey ( 1 997) and Hill (2004).
Draft position data were obtained from the Sporting News NBA Guides 1 995-2000.
Player race, pos1t10n, and education are from www.NBA.com and
www.databasebasketball.com. Annual salary data are from Rodney Fort's website
at http ://users. pullman . com/rodfort/SportsBusiness/BizFrame.htm and
www.usatoday.com website.
Washington forfeited its 1 997 first-round pick in connection with its signing of
Juwan Howard. Washington would have had the 1 7th pick overall.
Running the regression both with and without the 49 observations of draftees who
never played a game in the NBA did not change either the sign or the level of
significance of the coefficient on the education-level variable. Thus, the results from
our basic regression model were not affected, based on this reduction in sample size.
Sigelman & Zeng, 1 999; Maddala, 1 992.
In our dataset of players drafted from 1 995-2000, 74% of the players had careers of
either 3 or fewer years or I O or more years. 41 % had careers of 3 or fewer years and
33% had careers of ten or more years.
See Staw and Hoang ( 1 995). They test whether the amount oftime played and career
length are affected by draft order and find that NBA teams give more playing time
to higher draft picks after adjusting for performance.
Phil Kegler (20 I 0)

